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OPINION, PROBABLE CAUSE, FACTUAL
INVESTIGATION: THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NTSB
REPORTS AND INVESTIGATOR'S OPINIONS IN
AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Act' (the Act) creates a legal minefield for the
unwary and uninitiated attorney handling air crash litigation because of its
strict wording and bias toward the aviation industry. According to the
plain language of the Act and the attendant regulations, no potential civil
litigants, their representatives, or any insurance company(ies), shall participate or even observe the National Transportation Safety Board's (the
NTSB's) investigation of the crash. 2 Further, no civil litigant may use the
resulting reports and investigator opinions as evidence in a civil trial3
Considering the NTSB initially and exclusively controls the crash site and
wreckage, narrow judicial construction of the Act would work substantial
hardship on litigants by preventing both first hand observation of the evidence and making full use of the results of the government's investigation.
A lawyer's awareness of frequent judicial reluctance to inflict such hard-

' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958)
(the Act).
2 See 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)(1), (3) (1998), which limits the parties to the
investigation to "those persons, government agencies, companies, and
associations whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in
the accident or incident

. .

." and provides that "[nio party to the investigation

shall be represented in any aspect of the NTSB investigation by any person who
also represents claimants or insurer. . .

."

id.

' 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b)(1994). The statute provides: "[nlo part of a report of
the [NTSB], related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be
admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a
matter mentioned in the report." Id.
' 49 U.S.C. § 1131, 1134 (1997). Section 1131 provides that the NTSB
shall "investigate or have investigated" and establish the facts, circumstances, and
cause or probable cause of an aircraft accident. Id. at § 1131 (a)(1). Section 1134
authorizes a NTSB investigator to enter, inspect, and move accident wreckage
from an accident site. Id. at § 1134(a)(1), (b)(l),(2).
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ship on litigants may save time and money and provide evidence that
might otherwise be unobtainable.5
This article discusses when, notwithstanding the Act's prohibitory language, a court may admit NTSB investigative reports and
investigator opinions as evidence in a civil trial. Section I presents a
brief overview of the legislative regulation of air transportation
while section II analyzes the federal courts' interpretation of the
statutory prohibition against admitting NTSB reports and opinions in
civil trials through the mid-1980's. Section III addresses the conflict
between the Act's prohibition on, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
(the Rules) trend toward, admissibility raised by the Supreme Court
decision in Beech Aircraft v. Rainey6 decision. Section IV discusses
the admissibility trends of the last decade.
Although not the focus of this article, a nuance about which
practitioners must be aware is the NTSB's discretion to delegate its
investigatory powers to the Federal Aviation Administration (the
FAA).7 While major civilian air crash cases involve investigations
by the NTSB's own investigators, the NTSB often delegates nonfatal
and smaller aircraft accident investigations to local FAA personnel!
Accordingly, although the NTSB is the body predominantly referred

' Interview with Gary M. Arber, Attorney, in Brookline, Mass. (Jan. 21,
1998) (noting NTSB's removal of wreckage from crash site deprives litigants
opportunity to view site undisturbed). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1134(a)(1), (b)(2)
(authorizing NTSB investigators to move accident wreckage from accident site).
6 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
7 See NTSB Accident/Incident Investigation Procedures, 49 C.F.R. § 831.2
(1998) (empowering the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to
delegate the investigation to the FAA). The regulation makes clear that the
investigation remains a NTSB investigation notwithstanding the delegation to the
FAA. Id. Further, although the FAA conducts the investigation, the NTSB
retains full control and determines the probable cause of the accident. Id.
' Interview with Gary M. Arber, supra note 5. Local FAA personnel
involved in an air crash investigation can be a good source of information
because they often have knowledge of the local area, pilots, and airports. Id.
They also are often aware of prior incidents that, though they did not result in an
accident at the time, may be relevant to the accident investigated. Id.
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to in this article, in a practitioner's particular accident, the FAA may
be the investigating body.
II. HISTORY OF AIR TRAVEL REGULATION
In 1926, Congress, seeking to foster growth in the air transport
industry by enhancing accident prevention, passed legislation to
regulate air travel and investigate aircraft accidents. 9 Early in the
legislative history of air travel regulation, Congress vested the power
to investigate all air accidents in the then newly created Secretary of
Air Commerce in order to centralize the investigatory process and
data compilation.'0 In 1934, Congress empowered the Secretary to
hold hearings and subpoena witnesses and documents while at the
same time prohibiting the use of the Secretary's report in litigation
involving the accident investigated." Congress sought to protect the
reports because (1) the investigation determines causation, not fault,
and (2) the presence of litigants might bias the report. 2
As air travel grew, and accordingly the investigatory burden, the
Secretary, pursuant to his regulatory powers, created the Civil Aero-

See generally C.O. Miller, Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional
and Legal Perspectives, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 237 (1981) (providing an in depth
history of air accident investigation legislation). The author served as the
Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the NTSB. Id.
'0 The Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
Current codification in section 1131 of the Federal Aviation Act provides that the
NTSB shall "investigate or have investigated" and establish the facts,
circumstances, and cause or probable cause of an aircraft accident pursuant to
section 1132; section 1132 grants authority to investigate civil aircraft accidents.
49 U.S.C. § 1132.
" Pub. L. No. 730418, 48 Stat. 1113 (1934). Originally codified at 49
U.S.C. § 581. Repealed 1958 and superceded by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958. See also Miller, supra note 9 at 238.
2 See Miller, supra note 9, at 275 (discussing distinction of probable cause
in investigatory setting versus litigation, noting greater in-depth investigation in
litigation setting). Id. at 266-67. Cause, in the context of a NTSB investigation,
is not a search for current liability but rather a search for prevention in the future.
Id. at 267.
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nautics Board (the CAB) to investigate and report on aircraft accidents. 3 The scope of the CAB's investigators' testimony likewise
falls under statutory control, limiting it to their factual observations
and prohibiting their expression of opinion. 4 The regulations further
limit litigant access to NTSB investigators by restricting their testimony to one appearance through interrogatories or deposition 5 with
testimony at the actual trial requiring permission from General
Counsel. 6 Part 835 of the Code of Federal Regulations explains that
the reasons for restricting the scope and availability of investigator
testimony include limiting the burden extensive testifying would
place on the NTSB and preventing undue influence on litigation. 7
As aviation regulation evolved to the current day codification of the
Federal Aviation Act,'8 Congress has maintained these prohibitions
under a belief that doing so protects the investigatory process and
prevents NTSB opinions from supplanting the role of the civil factfinder.' 9

" See, Miller, supra note 9, at 239 (noting creation of new board did not
change civil admissibility prohibition already established).
14 49 C.F.R. § 835.3 (1998). Sec. 835.3(b) provides in pertinent part:
[NTSB] employees may only testify as to the factual information obtained during
the course of an investigation, including factual evaluations embodied in their
factual accident reports. However, they shall decline to testify regarding matters
beyond the scope of their investigation and they shall not give any expert or
opinion testimony.
49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b).
" 49 C.F.R. § 835.5(a), (c) (1998).
16 49 C.F.R. § 835.6(a) (1998).
It is important to note that section 835.6(c)
prohibits litigants from serving a subpoena upon a NTSB employee in connection
with taking of depositions. § 835.6(c). See also Universal Airline, Inc. v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (observing courts
typically defer to NTSB except where original deposition testimony was
inadequate or investigator was particularly uncooperative).
1749 C.F.R. § 835.3
'a Federal Aviation Act of 1958 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
'9 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b)(1994). The statute provides: "[n]o part of a report of
the [NTSB], related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be
admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a
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These prohibitions combined with the exclusion of potential litigants and insurers work a substantial hardship on litigants because
the NTSB has statutory right to the initial exclusive use of the accident wreckage for investigative purposes, often removing the wreckage from the crash site.20 Further, federal regulations restrict the
status of "party to the field investigation" to those persons representing the government and companies or associations whose products or services were involved in the accident, resulting in limited
access of outside parties.2 The underlying policy recognizes the
unique expertise of these designated parties as well their interest in
future accident prevention. An obvious contradiction exists in the
regulations because the manufacturer or association may well become a party to a civil suit for which they have unique preparation as
an investigative party.2 Further, their participation in the investigation could potentially bias the final report in their own favor therefore benefiting them at any subsequent trial.23
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Careful investigation into aviation accident case law reveals
that, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, certain types
of reports generated for use by the NTSB as well as some opinion
testimony of the investigators will often be allowed at trial.24 Judges

matter mentioned in the report." Id. See also Miller, supra note 9, for an indepth discussion of the legislative history of the regulation of aircraft safety and
the responsibilities of each governing body.
20 See 49 C.F.R. § 831.11 (excluding litigants and insurers from status of
party to investigation); 49 U.S.C. § 1134 (a), (b) (authorizing NTSB investigators
to enter, inspect, and move accident wreckage from accident site).
2 49 C.F.R. § 831.1 l(a)(1) (1998).
2
3 Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law, § 22, 22-18 (1991).
23 id.

See, e.g., Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 317 F.2d. 628, 632 (3d Cir. 1963)
(holding that calculations made by third party and included in the CAB report
admissible under § 1441(e)); In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C., No. MDL 1041,
1996 WL 926575, at *8 (D.C.S.) Dec. 27, 1996 (holding investigator's summary
admissible under statute but barred because of trustworthiness issues caused by
third-party edits); Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D. Va. 1972)
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frequently rely on the policy underlying the prohibition -- that the
NTSB's own determination of the cause of the accident not supplant
the jury's function -- to allow NTSB reports and NTSB investigator
testimony into evidence as long as they do not disclose the NTSB's
probable cause determination." This position developed over time
and ultimately resulted
in the NTSB itself incorporating these deci26
sions into its policies.
A. Admissibility of FactualTestimony and Reports

Early in aviation accident litigation, most courts declined to
construe the statutory prohibition of the Act narrowly. Courts reasoned that the purpose of the prohibition was to prevent the NTSB's
probable cause from reaching the jury, but that the intent was not to
prevent the jury from hearing factual and expert testimony in general." By 1951 the underlying policy of the prohibition, as articulated in Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,28 emerged

as the focal point for decisions. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded, pursuant to section

(allowing employee testimony which does not address ultimate issue or probable
cause). But see In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207,
1212,(N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying admissibility of any part of NTSB report).
See, e.g., Berguido, 317 F.2d. at 632 (noting policy conflict between
absolute privilege and full availability results in exclusion of reports expressing
probable cause); In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C., No. MDL 1041, 1996 WL
926575, at *8 (D.C.S. Dec. 27, 1996 (observing history of court interpretation in
favor statutory admissibility of factual portions of NTSB reports); Kline, 345 F.
Supp. at 33 (finding limits on investigator testimony which did not address
ultimate NTSB finding of cause unnecessarily cut off primary avenue to truth).
But see In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207,
1212,(N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying admissibility of any part of NTSB report because
of absolute statutory bar).
16 See Miller, supra note 9, at 260-61 (discussing NTSB
notices and
elaboration in Federal Register regarding its regulations and interpretations
resulting from evolution in judicial decisions).
27 See, e.g. Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993,
1000 (1951).
188 F.2d 993 (1951).
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701(e) of the Act, that while an NTSB employee's factual testimony
was admissible, testimony reflecting the opinion or probable cause of
the accident was inadmissible because it would usurp the role of the
fact finder.29
Later in the same year, Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc.3 ° ex-

panded the holding of Universal by applying the admissibility of
factual testimony to an equally factual investigative report.3 The
NTSB report contained no opinions and was entered into evidence as
past recollection recorded through the author who was available for
cross-examination." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit distinguished between NTSB reports containing
opinions as to cause and negligence from those containing an "investigator's personal observations about the condition of the plane
after the accident," the latter admitted through past recollection recorded.33 The appellate court concluded that § 701(e) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act 34 would not be offended by the admissibility of the

Id. at 1000.

192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
See Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220 (determining investigator's factual report did
not offend purpose of statutory prohibition).
12

Id. The report contained

no findings based on interviews or anything but personal observations. Nothing in the report offends either the opinion or the
hearsay rule. Sec. 701(e) was designed to guard against the introduction of C.A.B. reports expressing the agency views about
matters which are within the functions of the courts and juries
to decide.
Id. (quoting Universal Airline v. Eastern Airline, 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1951))

" See Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220. (observing report contained same information
as investigator's CAB authorized deposition and properly admitted at trial). The
author of the report testified in a deposition as to substance of report. Id.
34 Civil Aeronautics Act 49 U.S.C.A. § 58 1, providing in pertinent part:
no part of any report or reports of the former Air Safety Board
or the Civil Aeronautics Board relating to any accident, or the
investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in
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report because the report would not interfere with the fact-finding
role of the jury. 35 Further, the hearsay rule would not be violated
because the author of the report testified as to its contents and such
testimony was open to cross-examination by defense counsel.36 The
appellate court concluded that the goal of the statutory prohibition
was not to prevent use of the report per se, but rather to prevent the
NTSB from being, in effect, the final arbiter of the civil case by virtue of its probable cause determinations.37 What began as a rule on
the scope of admissible investigator testimony grew into a seemingly
contrary interpretation of apparently clear statutory language prohibiting admission of investigative reports.
B. The Struggle Over Opinion and Probable Cause

In 1963, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled, in Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,38 that calculations,

necessarily requiring assumptions and inferences regarding the evidence, were inadmissible not because of the prohibition against
opinion testimony, but because they were hearsay that could not be
cross-examined. 9 Noting that the policy underlying the prohibition

any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.
Id.
See Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220. The investigator's report consisted of his
personal observations about the condition of the plane. Id. Section 701(e) of the
Civil Aeronautics Act as codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 581 provides in pertinent part:
no part of any report or reports of the former Air Safety Board or the Civil
Aeronautics Board relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be
admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of
any matter mentioned in such report or reports.
35

Id.
Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220.
See id. (describing policy underlying statutory prohibition as guarding
against expressing agency views about issues fact-finder should decide).
" 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
Plaintiffs sought admissibility of
'9 Berguido, 317 F.2d at 632.
by
a
third person not present at trial to
mathematical calculations performed
support testimony of CAB employee. Id. at 630-31. The court found this
17
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worked a compromise between an absolute privilege to facilitate full
and frank CAB investigations and absolute disclosure of evidence to
litigants, the appellate court seemed amenable to at least some opinion testimony.40 The court distinguished between general opinion
testimony of a CAB investigator and her opinion testimony that reflects the CAB's probable cause findings. Such opinion now differentiated, only probable cause opinion, which violated the underlying
purpose and policy of the prohibition, was inadmissible.
As the courts struggled to discern between opinion, opinion that
specifically goes to probable cause, factual inferences, and fact, they
became more frustrated with the rules they had created.
In response, the courts moved toward admitting investigators' opinions
providing they did not encompass or directly indicate the probable
cause of the accident."

testimony admissible under § 1441 (e) because the testimony did not express the
agency views of probable cause. Id. at 631-32. However, the court held that
defendant's inability to cross-examine the mathematician as to assumptions made
for purposes of his calculations performed resulted in inadmissible hearsay and
therefore rendered the testimony inadmissible. Id. at 632. See also FED. R. EVID.
801 (c) (defining hearsay as out of court statement by one other than testifying
witness and offered for truth of matter asserted).
40 Berguido, 317 F.2d at 631.
41 Id. at 632.
42 id.

e.g. American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d. 180, 196 (5th
Cir. 1969)(finding the rule sorting fact from opinion developed in Fidelity and
Casualty Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964), should yield to rule
excluding only opinion testimony regarding probable cause of accident).
IId.; see also Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(asserting statutory bar only proscribes admissibility of ultimate issue or probable
cause); but see Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964)
(articulating rule that all statements of opinion must be redacted from otherwise
factual and admissible CAB subcommittee reports).
43 See

34
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C. A Legislative Response to Judicial Interpretationof the Act

The Independent Safety Board Act,45 enacted in 1974 (the "1974
Act"), retained the prohibition of NTSB employee opinion testimony, ' 6 but the 1975 revision of the regulations governing NTSB
employee testimony, Part 835.3(b), contained a concession to the
courts found in the Federal Register. 47 The Federal Register stated:

The only opinions of investigators proscribed now are
those which reflect the ultimate determination of
cause or probable cause determined by the board and
expressed in the Board's reports. The Board considers
its revised policy to be consistent with the existing
law, relying in particular on Kline v. Martin , . .. the

Board continues its prohibition against the requirement that investigators should testify on matters beyond the scope of their investigation. 49

The Independent Safety Board Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 89 Stat. 2156
(1975). This act separated the NTSB from the FAA in an attempt to remedy the
incestuous nature of their relationship and eliminate constraints to thorough and
effective accident investigation. See also Roy Tress Atwood, Comment,
Admissibility of National TransportationSafety Board Reports in Civil Air Crash
Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM. 469, 485 (1987) (noting NTSB, brought into
existence by Department of Transportation Act of 1966, often investigated its
sister agency FAA).
The original prohibition codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) as represented in
the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, § 304(c) was codified as 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 1903(c) the text of which remained largely unchanged: "No part of any report
or reports of the National Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident or
the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or
reports." Id.
4' National Transportation Safety Board Redesignation
and Revision of
Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30232 (1974)(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 835).
345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va 1972)
49 National Transportation Safety Board Redesignation
and Revision of
Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30232. The NTSB refers to the decision in Kline v.
Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, which abandoned the complete exclusion of all opinion
41
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Also worth noting, because of the consistency with this concession,
is that a careful reading of Part 835.3(b) permits NTSB employee
factual testimony to "[include] factual evaluations embodied in their
factual accident report."50 The only prohibitions concern testimony
on matters '"beyond the scope of their investigation" or "opinion or
expert testimony" concerning the cause of the accident." The plain
language of the regulation implies that opinions are permissible as
long as they stop short of speculating on the cause of the accident."
The NTSB set forth a compromise but still insisted that the
NTSB's report remain out of litigant's reach." The complexity and
scope of accident investigation grew over time, necessitating the
production of two distinctly different reports: the Factual Aircraft
Accident Report 4 and the NTSB's probable cause report also known
as the 'blue cover' report." As of the 1975 regulation change, while
the proscription against using the probable cause report remained, it
no longer included the use of the investigator's factual report, therefore opening wide the door to their use in civil suits.56 The use of

testimony as unworkable and concurred with rule espoused in American Airlines,
Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1964) which stated, "it would
be better to exclude opinion testimony only when it embraces the probable cause
of the accident or the negligence of the defendant." Id. (emphasis added).
'0 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b) (1998).
"I Id. (emphasis added); see also National Transportation Safety Board
Redesignation and Revision of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30232 (relaxing
proscription of opinion to include only opinions reflecting ultimate determination
of probable cause)(emphasis added). The NTSB, acknowledging the changing
interpretation of its prohibition of employee opinion testimony, modified the
proscription so as to reflect recent court decisions. Id.
52 National Transportation Safety Board Redesignation and Revision of
Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30232.
" 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b) (1998).
14 See generally 3 KREINDLER AVIATION ACCIDENT
LAW § 28 (1991)
(providing illustrations of various NTSB accident report forms).
" See Miller, supra note 9, at 261-62 (discussing splitting apart original
NTSB Accident Report into different sub-reports isolating probable cause into
"blue cover" report). See generally KREINDLER, supra note 22, ch. 22.
S6 Miller, supra note 9, at 261-62.

36

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

two different reports allowed the NTSB to keep its final probable
cause determinations out of the courtroom more easily because the
permissible factual portions of the investigation were contained in
detail in a separate report.
While courts continued to struggle with the issue of the admissibility of NTSB reports, the Kline v. Martin rule took hold.57 The
United States Court of Appeals began by affirming the admissibility
of NTSB employee opinion testimony as long as that opinion did not
speculate on the proximate cause of the accident. 8 Then, in 1986, A
question arose in the Tenth Circuit in Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft
Corp.5 9 concerning the admissibility of expert testimony based on the
factual findings in the NTSB's reports. 6° Quickie contended that
Mullan's expert impermissibly relied on the NTSB report when giving his opinion on the cause of the accident, which, as Quickie noted,
was the same as the NTSB's determination. 6' The Tenth Circuit reasoned that current judicial construction of the statutory prohibition
excludes only portions of reports containing the NTSB's probable
cause findings and accordingly an expert may rely on factual por-

" See Protectus Alpha Navigation v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc., 767
F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding § 1441(e) complete bar to admissibility
of NTSB reports notwithstanding judicial gloss admitting factual statements);
Chevron, USA v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 779 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding
statutory prohibition allows factual statements but forbids use of conclusory
statements in NTSB reports); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 816 (4th
Cir. 1982) (holding district court properly excluded conclusory statements
addressing the issue of pilot's negligence as probable cause of accident).
See Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 551 (10th Cir. 1978)
(finding no error in admitting NTSB investigator testimony, noting testimonial
bar detrimental to private citizens and contrary to Part 835.3(b)).
'9 797 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1986).
60 Mullan, 797 F.2d at 848.
61 Id. Quickie tried to equate the prohibition on
admissibility of NTSB
reports to their use by Mullen's outside expert witness. Id. The court rejected the
argument pointing to precedent allowing admission of factual portions of the
reports and accordingly approved report use as the factual basis upon which the
expert testified. Id.
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tions of the reports. 6' The court found that the expert permissibly
relied on the factual portions of the report and therefore ruled the
testimony admissible.63 In so doing the court admonished, "[t]o hold,
as Quickie's argument suggests, that [the expert] impermissibly relied on the NTSB report because his conclusions were the same as or
similar to those of the NTSB investigators, is an inference which we
shall not make. 6 4 The court made clear that rulings on admissibility
are based on the law and not speculation of impropriety. 5
Likewise, NTSB reports were finding their way into evidence.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Riggs,66 the appellate court sustained
the trial courts admission of factual portions of the NTSB reports.67
The court declined to examine the appropriateness of the district
court's ruling, noting that the 1974 Act forbade the use of conclusory
sections of the NTSB report, which the district court then properly
excluded. 68
D. The Ninth CircuitHardLine Stance Against Admissibility of
NTSB Reports
As the majority of courts across circuits at both the district and
appellate level favored admissibility of NTSB reports at least in part,
a 1986 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit took a different stand. In Prospectus Alpha Naviga69

62 Mullan, 797

F.2d at 848.

63Id.
6 Id.
Mullan, 797 F.2d at 848.
' 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1981).
67

See Travelers, 671 F.2d at 817.

See id. See also Curry v. Chevron, USA, 779 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir.
1985) (acknowledging "judicial gloss" allowing NTSB reports into evidence
without opinions on probable cause). The court, resting on the 1974 Act's
prohibition of the use of NTSB probable cause report in civil trials, declined to
allow the plaintiffs expert to testify that he relied on the probable cause
conclusions in the NTSB's report. See also FED. R. EvID. 703 (providing data
underlying expert's testimony need not be separately admissible as evidence).
See Prospectus Alpha Navigation v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc.,
767 F.2d at 1385 (holding NTSB reports inadmissible in civil trials).

38

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

tion v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc., ° the court narrowly construed the statutory provision prohibiting the use of NTSB reports as
evidence in civil trials reasoning that the plain language of the statute
was unambiguous.7 ' The appellate court, although noting the more
permissive stance other courts were taking on admissibility of NTSB
Reports, ruled such reports, to the extent they express the probable
cause of the accident, excludable in their entirety." Citing no supporting authority and in the face of ample authority to the contrary,
the Ninth Circuit then upheld the exclusion of the NTSB report in its
entirety, calling it "another trier of fact's conclusion as to what happened. ... "" The Ninth Circuit was virtually alone in its holding.
IV. BEECH AIRCRAFT V. RAINEY DECISION AND ITS
EFFECTS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NTSB REPORTS
One year after enactment of the 1974 Act, the new Federal
Rules of Evidence 4 (the Rules) took effect presenting a potentially
new challenge to the NTSB's ability to prohibit the admission of the
probable cause report.75 Exceptions to expert and opinion testimony
were introduced which challenged the remaining restrictions to investigators testifying as to their opinion based on evidence other than

Id.
" See id. at 1385 (finding NTSB report "merely another trier of fact's

10

conclusion as to what transpired on that fatal evening").
' Id. The court cited various cases illustrating prior admissibility of NTSB
investigative reports including Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547,
549-51 (10th Cir. 1978), American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180,
196 (5th Cir.1969), and Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628, 631-32
(3rd Cir. 1963). Id
See Prospectus Alpha Navigation, 767 F.2d at 1385. 'The district court
had before it all seven volumes of the transcript of the Coast Guard hearing on
which the report in question was based, and the excluded report was merely
another trier of fact's conclusion as to what transpired on that fatal evening." Id.
74 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
71 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 166-67
(1988)
(discussing admissibility of Navy investigative reports under Federal Rules of
Evidence).
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their own observations.7 6 Further, an exception to the hearsay rule
allowed the admission of public records and reports.77
A. Beech Aircraft Sustains Broad Admissibility for Evaluative Reports

In 1986, the same year as the Prospectus decision, the Supreme
Court in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey heard arguments on the
question of whether the public records hearsay exception of the the
Rules, 8 providing for the admissibility of investigatory reports containing "factual findings", extended to conclusions and opinions
contained within the reports. 9 The Court, acknowledging the dichotomy of opinions at the appellate level as well as in the congressional subcommittees that debated the Rules, reasoned that the Advisory Committee intended that courts generally admit the reports.80 In
fact, the rule was drafted and adopted in the face of split court decisions and statutorily mandated hearsay exceptions.8 The Senate Ad-

76

See e.g., FED. R. EvID. 703 (allowing expert testimony based on

information of type reasonably relied upon by experts in field, regardless of
separate admissibility); FED. R. EVID. 704 (providing for testimony on ultimate
issue of case); FED. R. EvID. 705 (permitting opinion testimony without testifying
as to underlying facts unless asked on cross-examination or required by court).
77 FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C). The rule provides an exception to the hearsay
rule for "reports ...of public offices or agencies ... setting forth ... factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law.., unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness." Id.
"s FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C). Rule 803(8)(C) provides admissibility for
"[riecords, reports, statements, or data compilations.., setting forth... factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness" regardless of the availability of the declarant as a witness. Id.
79 Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 156.
goId. at 166-67. See also S. Rep., 93-1277 at 13 (1974) (rejecting narrow
construction of House Committee and opting instead for Advisory Committee's
assumption of admissibility balanced by trustworthiness test).
8' See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 166 (discussing diverging appeals
court decisions and statutory exceptions to hearsay rule). See also FED. R. EVID.
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visory Committee responded to the dichotomy by drafting a rule,
ultimately accepted by Congress, that assumes the general admissibility of "evaluative" reports subject to a test of trustworthiness. 2 A
further safeguard exists within the rule requiring that the reports set
forth "factual findings resulting from investigation," therefore excluding statements not based on factual investigation.83 Notwithstanding the safeguards built into the rule, other rules of evidence
involving relevance and prejudice provide further screening of the
admissibility of these reports.84
The Court further found this interpretation consistent with the
broader approach the Rules take in allowing expert opinion testi-

803(8)(C) advisory committee's note (discussing controversial nature of
"evaluative" reports and dichotomy of decisions involving their admissibility).
8 See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 167 (noting the escape provision in
final clause of rule excluded reports if sources of the information lacked
trustworthiness"); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note

(favoring general admissibility of reports subject to consideration of presence of
negative factors). The Advisory Committee Note concluded in favor of the
general admissibility of reports but provided "ample provision for escape if
sufficient negative factors are present." Id. The Advisory Committee proposed
four factors that might be considered when passing on the trustworthiness of the
report: (1)the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or
experience; (3) whether a hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports
are prepared with a view to possible litigation (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109 (1943)). Id.
See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 164 (proposing the proper reading
of rule as not "factual findings" are admissible but that reports, setting forth
factual findings, are admissible). See also S. Rep., 93-1277 at 13 (1974) (taking
exception to the House Judiciary Committee's limit of admissibility to "factual
findings" noting guidance of many statutes allowing admissibility of particular
evaluative reports).
See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 168. (discussing discretion judge
maintains in admitting such reports); see also FED. R. EVID. 401-403 (permitting
admission of evidence tending to make material fact more, or less, probable
except where probative value outweighed by unfair prejudice).
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mony even when the opinion is on the ultimate issue in the case."
The court reasoned that because facts were really just a more specific
and detailed statement of- opinion, the reports should be treated no
differently than expert opinion testimony.86 Though experts on the
stand are subject to cross-examination, Rule 803 generally provides
for admissibility of public records and reports notwithstanding the
availability of the witness.17 Accordingly, when viewed with the
safeguards present in the rule itself, the broader view in favor of admissibility is more in keeping with the general thrust of the Federal
Rules because it promotes full disclosure of all relevant information
to the jury. The Court unanimously held that 803(8)(C) does not
exclude factually based conclusions or opinions contained in the reports.8 9 Accordingly, rather than an arbitrary distinction between
opinion and fact, courts should rely on the concepts of trustworthiness, relevance, prejudice, and the right of opposing parties to present contradictory evidence in determining admissibility of an
evaluative report. 9°

Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 169. See also FED. R. EvID. 701-705
(allowing expert witness opinion testimony on ultimate issue and lay witness
opinion testimony drawn from own observations when testimony helpful to trier
of fact).
86 See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 168-69 (articulating the analytic
difficulty in draw a distinction between fact and opinion). The court opined that
the "factual finding" statement in the JAG report that "at the time of impact, the
engine of 3E955 was operating but was operating at reduced power" was a
deduction from smaller observed clues of the investigator who did not actually
observe the engine running at the time of impact. Id. at 169. Labeling this a fact
rather than an opinion called for an arbitrary line drawing exercise to distinguish
between shades of grey. Id.
87 Beech

Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 160.

See also FED. R. EVID. 803

(providing admissibility for public records and reports under section 8(C)
regardless of declarant availability).
See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 169 (finding no reason to interpret
Rule 803(8)(C) contrary to liberal thrust of the Federal Rules).
" Id. at 170.

9oSee id. at 167-68 (relying on safeguards built into FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C)
and other attendant rules to dictate admissibility).
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B. A Battle of the Acts: FederalRules of Evidence
Versus the 1974 Act

A conflict arises between the statutory prohibition of the use of
NTSB accident reports of various types and the Rules that would
admit them in their entirety. 9' This conflict arises because of the different goals and purposes underlying each one. This battle of the
Acts played out in both federal district and appeals courts with the
same conclusion: a federal statute that restricts admissibility shall
preempt the Rules because the statutes are designed to deal with very
specific subject matter while the Rules give more general guidance. 9
Consequently, while factual portions of NTSB reports continued to
be admissible, the Beech Aircraft decision did not destroy the statutory prohibition forbidding probable cause conclusion and opinion
testimony. 93 We are reminded by Beech Aircraft, though, that other

" FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). The rule provides admissibility subject only to
trustworthiness and a requirement that they set forth "factual findings resulting
from investigation." Id.
92 Interview with Hon. William G. Young, United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, in Boston, Mass. (Mar. 9, 1998). The canons of
statutory construction hold that a federal statute dealing with a specific subject
matter preempts a general federal statute. Id. Therefore, the specific prohibition
of NTSB reports use in civil litigation preempts the general admissibility of FED.
R. EVID. 803(8)(c). Id. Even when the prohibition is set out by regulation,
though subordinate to the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts tend to give
deference to the regulation and their underlying policy(s). Id. Accord In re
Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 F.3d 105, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding report
filed pursuant to federal regulation admissible because Federal Rules of Evidence
control except as provided in U.S. Constitution, Act of Congress, or rules
prescribed by Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority); In re Cleveland
Tankers, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 463, 465 (E.D. Mich., S.D 1992) (finding Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) not controlling because JAG report
filed pursuant to regulation not statutory authority).
9' See Cleveland Tankers, 821 F. Supp. at 465 (holding no error in admitting
factual portions of NTSB report but excluding opinions and legal conclusions).
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evidentiary considerations may effect the admissibility of even factual portions of the reports.94
V. THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD ADMISSIBILITY
During the last decade, the general trend toward admissibility
broadened across the circuits at the district court level except, most
notably, the Ninth Circuit where case law has been scant, and the
Northern District of Illinois where the courts have followed the
Ninth Circuit Prospectus decision. 9 Since 1991, three decisions in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
have barred the use of the reports.96 The district court judge, in In re
Air Crash Disasterat Sioux City, Iowa,97 after lengthy discussion and
acknowledgement of the broad line of decisions to the contrary, denied admissibility of any portion of the NTSB's final "Aircraft Accident Report" sought to be entered. 98 The judge gave three reasons
for denial: (1) many of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs were inapposite because they only pertained to witness testimony; 99 (2) a
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
stated that NTSB reports are barred as evidence in court; '°° and (3)

94 See Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 169 (noting rules on expert and lay
witness testimony as well as the rule of completeness affect admissibility).
9 Compare In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo., 720
F.Supp. 1493, 1496 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding NTSB reports admissible with court
approved redaction of opinion and probable cause findings), with In re Air Crash
Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207, 1212 (N.D. Ill., 1991) (holding
NTSB report not admissible).
'6
See In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1212 (holding
NTSB reports not admissible). Accord J. Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR Pipeline
Co., No. 89-C-0377, 1995 WL 317072, at *3 (N.D.III. May 23, 1995); Trans
States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., No. 92-C-1658, 1995 WL
59235, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1995).
'7
780 F. Supp. at 1212.
780 F. Supp. at 1209-10 (relying heavily on "unambiguous prohibitory
language" of statute barring admissibility of NTSB reports at trial).
99 Id.

'0 780 F. Supp. at 12 10-11. The court, quoting dicta from Thomas Brooks
Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 639 (10th Cir. 1990) where the Tenth Circuit
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the cases that do stand for admissibility of NTSB reports rely on
FRE 803(8)(C) for admissibility, an argument that creates a "slippery
slope" leading to admission of NTSB opinions just short of the probable cause finding. °'
Interestingly, not one case mentions the
NTSB's 1975 regulation revision interpreting Part 835 as no longer
excluding the investigator's factual accident report, making the Tenth
Circuit's holding wrong, as a matter of law.'02
Notwithstanding the decisions in the Northern District of Illinois, factual portions of NTSB accident reports are now usually admitted into evidence at trial with one of the most permissive decisions coming from South Carolina in In re Air Crash at Charlotte,

North Carolina.'°3 The court admitted nine NTSB Group Chairman's
Factual Reports during one motion in limine hearing, subject to the
defendant's opportunity to point out opinions or conclusions that
might be redacted.' 04 The court opined that "since 1951, Circuit

reversed a district court ruling allowing the representative of a victim of a plane
crash to observe an NTSB investigation. 780 F. Supp. at 1211.
'0' 780 F. Supp. at 1211-12. The court pointed to In re Air Crash at
Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo. to support its argument because that court
allowed admission of otherwise inadmissible portions of the NTSB report for
purposes of impeachment. Id.
'0' See National Transportation Safety Board Redesignation and Revision of
Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30232 (eliminating investigator's factual accident
report from its strictures and allowing employee opinion testimony short of
probable cause).
103 No. MDL 1041, 1996 WL 926575 (D.S.C. Dec. 27, 1996). Accord In re
Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 464 (admitting factual portions of NTSB
report acknowledging "judicial gloss" on statutory prohibition of NTSB report
admissibility); Budden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (D. Neb.
1990)(finding no opinions as to probable cause and therefore admitting NTSB
report to extent not precluded by other reasons such as double hearsay or lack of
trustworthiness); In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. at 1494
(affirming admission of edited NTSB Human Factors report adopted by the
NTSB as final probable cause report).
104 In re Air Crash at Charlotte, North Carolina, 1996 WL 926575, at *3
(admitting the reports subject to requests for redaction from opposing counsel of
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Courts have routinely admitted the factual portions of investigative
reports generated after an airline disaster" and therefore adequate
basis existed for its rulings.0 5
Even in less permissive decisions, the emphasis shifted away
from statutory construction and towards evidentiary challenges to the
otherwise admissible portions of the reports.' 6 Trustworthiness now
effects more decisions with courts noting that, while FRE 803(8)
contains a presumption of trustworthiness in government generated
reports, the presumption is rebuttable'0 7 Issues of double and triple
hearsay also command attention.0 8 Additionally, otherwise inadmissible portions of the reports may be admissible for the purposes of

specific portions deemed opinion and the reasons therefor and submitted by a set
date).
'05Id. at *4.The court proceeded to give a history of Appellate Court
decisions in support of its statement. Id. at *4-6. It noted contrary decisions in
Illinois but also pointed out they were in the minority. Id. at *6. Further, the
court found significance in Congress' retention of the identical language of The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1441(e) and 1903(c) in
the current codification at § 1154(b), notwithstanding judicial interpretation
differing with the plain language. Id. at *6.
'06See In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. at 1497-99
(holding NTSB Human Factors Report admissible after lengthy discussion of
trustworthiness and double and triple hearsay).
,07
See In re Air Crash at Charlotte, North Carolina, 1996 WL 926575, at *8
(finding investigator's summary unreliable and lacking trustworthiness). The
investigator's summary, generated from memory and discarded handwritten
notes, was further condensed by a third party and contained information that
some parties interviewed by the investigator later contested. Id. See also Air
Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F.Supp. at 1499-98 (quoting Kehm v.
Proctor and Gamble Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Iowa 1982) (noting
opponent of admissibility has burden to rebut trustworthiness presumption but
partial reliance on unconfirmable hearsay not ipso facto evidence of
untrustworthiness).
,08See Budden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (D. Neb. 1990)
(excluding portions of coroner's report contained in NTSB report due to
insurmountable double hearsay problems).
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impeachment.' °9 The practitioner, therefore, must pay close attention
to other issues that may effect the admissibility of the reports.
VI. CONCLUSION
This body of law, though still unsettled, suggests that the majority of courts will, at the very least, admit factual portions of NTSB
reports. Indeed, many decisions revolved not around general admissibility of the submitted report, which neither party contested, but
rather the scope of information included. Notwithstanding this
trend, a conclusion, as propounded by Roy Atwood in his 1987
Southern Methodist University Law Review Comment, that section

1154(b) is some how defunct seems premature. " Surely the basis
for the NTSB's protection of its probable cause findings and the judicial deference to that policy supports maintaining the statutory bar.
The civil litigant must still present her own case and, therefore,
may not rely on the NTSB to do it for her by using only NTSB investigative results. The judicial lifting of the restriction on the use of
factual reports provides only a starting point for the civil litigant's
own base of evidence supporting her case. Ever mindful of the potential for bias in the NTSB investigation and resulting reports, the
litigant must still do an exhaustive investigation of her own.
The Rules level the playing field by allowing litigants to present
expert witnesses who rely on NTSB materials by denying either
party from disclosing this reliance. Allowing expert testimony based
on a review of the facts disclosed in the NTSB reports eliminates a
litigant's tendency to seek impermissible probable cause testimony
from a NTSB employee. While the expert's testimony may comport
with the NTSB's own probable cause findings, the jury, denied this
fact, evaluates the testimony unbiased by the weight of NTSB
authority.

l09 See In re Air Crash at Charlotte, 1996 WL 926575, at *8 (allowing
excluded report for use by plaintiffs in cross-examination of persons
interviewed).
"0 See Atwood, supra note 45, at 503-04 (advocating Congressional action to
remove restrictions on use of NTSB findings).
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The civil litigant's need for full disclosure of all admissible relevant
evidence for the resolution of civil claims must be balanced against both
the judicial premise that the jury's decision must not be supplanted with
another body's decision and the NTSB's ability to carry out thorough and
unhampered investigations. An appropriate solution would be to change
the statutory text to specifically allow the admission of NTSB materials,
reports and investigator testimony that fall short of the NTSB's probable
cause finding. This would ensure uniformity and fairness of decisions
across all circuits as to general admissibility, leaving only the evidentiary
issue of screening out NTSB probable cause determinations for judicial
review.
Lorri E. Badolato

